CVE-2026-101910: ip-address: no classifier recognizes the NAT64 local-use range 64:ff9b:1::/48, allowing SSRF and trust-boundary bypass
Medium
- OSV id
- GHSA-2vr4-cq9g-pvrc
- Also known as
- CVE-2026-101910
- Published
- Last modified
Affected packages
| Package | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| ip-address npm |
>= 10.2.0, < 10.5.1 | 10.5.1 |
Versions we track that it affects: ip-address 10.5.0
How to fix it
Upgrade ip-address to 10.5.1 or later.
npm install ip-address@10.5.1
# if it is an indirect dependency: npm update ip-address (or npm audit fix)
- If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or force the version with "overrides" (npm), "resolutions" (Yarn) or "pnpm.overrides" (pnpm) in package.json.
- Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.
Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.
Details
Summary
No classifier on Address6 recognizes the NAT64 local-use range 64:ff9b:1::/48 (RFC 8215). isPrivate(), isLoopback(), isLinkLocal() and their siblings all return false for every address in it, so an internal IPv4 destination written through a local-use NAT64 prefix (64:ff9b:1:7f00:0:100:: for 127.0.0.1, 64:ff9b:1:a9fe:a9:fe00:: for 169.254.169.254) reads as an ordinary global address. getType() names the range 'NAT64 (local-use)', so the library knows what the address is and classifies it as nothing.
An application that builds a network trust-boundary decision on these checks (for example a filter intended to block Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF) will classify an internal target as external and allow the request. SSRF is an attack in which a user-supplied address coaxes the server into making a request to an internal destination the user could not otherwise reach, such as a loopback service or a cloud metadata endpoint.
Details
The fix for GHSA-22jq-vg5j-6vgg (10.2.1) classifies IPv4-mapped (::ffff:0:0/96) and NAT64 well-known (64:ff9b::/96) addresses by their embedded IPv4 address: embeddedIPv4() in src/ipv6.ts decodes the trailing 32 bits and every special-use classifier delegates to the resulting Address4. Those are the only two ranges embeddedIPv4() handles.
The local-use range differs in kind from the well-known prefix, which is why extending the decoder does not fix it. RFC 8215 reserves 64:ff9b:1::/48 so an operator can carve their own NAT64 prefix out of it, of any length RFC 6052 allows (/48, /56, /64, or /96). Where the IPv4 address sits depends on that choice: 127.0.0.1 is 64:ff9b:1:7f00:0:100:: under a /48 prefix and 64:ff9b:1::7f00:1 under a /96 prefix, and each of those decodes to a different address under the other prefix length. There is no single embedded IPv4 address for the library to classify by.
What is well-defined is the range as a whole. The IANA IPv6 Special-Purpose Address Registry lists 64:ff9b:1::/48 as not globally reachable, and Python's ipaddress module reports is_private as True and is_global as False for every address in it. isPrivate() covered ULA (fc00::/7) plus the decoded mapped and well-known cases, and nothing in the local-use range.
Affected versions
>= 10.2.0, <= 10.5.0. The is* classification API was extended to Address6 in 10.2.0; releases before it do not expose the method and are not affected through this vector.
Impact
Every address in 64:ff9b:1::/48 parses successfully, isValid() is true, and no classifier catches it. Which internal target is reached depends on the NAT64 prefix deployed on the server's network; the well-known prefix column is the patched control from GHSA-22jq-vg5j-6vgg.
| Internal target | Well-known form | Classified | Local-use form (/48 prefix) |
Classified |
|---|---|---|---|---|
127.0.0.1 |
64:ff9b::7f00:1 |
loopback | 64:ff9b:1:7f00:0:100:: |
nothing |
10.0.0.1 |
64:ff9b::a00:1 |
private | 64:ff9b:1:a00:0:100:: |
nothing |
169.254.169.254 |
64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe |
link-local | 64:ff9b:1:a9fe:a9:fe00:: |
nothing |
192.168.1.1 |
64:ff9b::c0a8:101 |
private | 64:ff9b:1:c0a8:1:100:: |
nothing |
Reachability
Reaching an internal host through one of these addresses requires that the server's network run a NAT64 translator on a prefix inside 64:ff9b:1::/48 and that the attacker guess or know the prefix length. That is the same precondition the well-known prefix carries (a translator on 64:ff9b::/96), with the additional constraint that the prefix is operator-chosen rather than fixed. The severity reflects that precondition.
Proof of concept
npm i ip-address@10.5.0, then:
const { Address6 } = require('ip-address');
// A guard of the shape the library documents.
function isBlocked(host) {
const a = new Address6(host);
return a.isLoopback() || a.isLinkLocal() || a.isPrivate() || a.isMulticast() || a.isUnspecified();
}
for (const h of ['64:ff9b::7f00:1', '64:ff9b:1:7f00:0:100::', '64:ff9b:1::7f00:1']) {
console.log(isBlocked(h) ? 'BLOCK' : 'ALLOW', h, '-> getType()', new Address6(h).getType());
}
On affected versions:
BLOCK 64:ff9b::7f00:1 -> getType() NAT64 (well-known)
ALLOW 64:ff9b:1:7f00:0:100:: -> getType() NAT64 (local-use)
ALLOW 64:ff9b:1::7f00:1 -> getType() NAT64 (local-use)
Remediation
Upgrade to the patched release. In the fix, isPrivate() returns true for every address in 64:ff9b:1::/48, alongside ULA and the decoded mapped and well-known cases. The range is reported private as a whole rather than by a decoded IPv4 address, for the reason given above; toAddress4Nat64(prefix) remains the way to decode an address under a known deployment prefix. isLoopback() and isLinkLocal() are unchanged for this range, since without the prefix length the library cannot know which IPv4 address is embedded.
If you cannot upgrade immediat
References
- GHSA-2vr4-cq9g-pvrc on OSV.dev
- Web: https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/security/advisories/GHSA-2vr4-cq9g-pvrc
- Advisory: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101910
- Web: https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/commit/ab3dc88bcf5374344168a2ba075ca7ac4ff257f8
- Package: https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address
- Web: https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/releases/tag/v10.5.1
Am I affected?
Upload or paste your lockfile. We check every package version in it against OSV.dev, this advisory included, and email you the vulnerable ones with the version that fixes them. Free, and no account needed.
About this data
Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.