CVE-2026-101918: PyJWT: Unauthenticated RecursionError DoS in pre-verification payload parse (PyJWKClient.get_signing_key_from_jwt / verify_signature=False)
Medium CVSS 5.3
- OSV id
- GHSA-42vr-xj54-vc7v
- Also known as
- CVE-2026-101918, PYSEC-2026-4141
- Published
- Last modified
Affected packages
| Package | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| pyjwt PyPI |
>= 2.0.0a1, < 2.15.0 | 2.15.0 |
Versions we track that it affects: pyjwt 2.8.0
How to fix it
Upgrade pyjwt to 2.15.0 or later.
# in requirements.txt: change the line to pyjwt==2.15.0
pip install -r requirements.txt
- If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or add a minimum version constraint for it (e.g. in constraints.txt, or as a dependency in pyproject.toml).
- Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.
Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.
Details
Summary
PyJWKClient.get_signing_key_from_jwt(token) — the first step of the JWKS
verification flow documented in docs/usage.rst — must decode a token's
payload before its signature can be checked, via
jwt.api_jwt.decode_complete(token, options={"verify_signature": False}).
That call parses the payload with json.loads in PyJWT._decode_payload
(jwt/api_jwt.py:297-300), whose except clause catches only ValueError.
A payload that is valid JSON but nested ~20,000 levels deep makes
json.loads raise RecursionError, which is not a ValueError and
escapes as a raw, undocumented exception type — not DecodeError,
InvalidTokenError, or PyJWTError, so every documented error-handling
pattern in docs/usage.rst misses it.
The token needs no valid signature and no network access — the crash
happens during payload parsing, before the kid is even looked up. A
single unauthenticated ~50KB request crashes the caller's auth handler
(HTTP 500 / dead worker), repeatably. The same path is reachable through
plain jwt.decode(token, options={"verify_signature": False}) too.
Notably, this project already fixed the identical bug class for the
JWS header path — PyJWS._load catches (ValueError, RecursionError)
and wraps it in DecodeError (jwt/api_jws.py:360-361), and
CHANGELOG.rst (v2.14.0, "Security") states "Handle deeply nested and
malformed JWS/JWK input without uncaught recursion errors." The payload
path — the one part of a forged token an unauthenticated attacker fully
controls — was left catching ValueError alone, so that security fix does
not fully hold.
A second, related instance: PyJWKClient.fetch_data (jwt/jwks_client.py:168)
parses a JWKS endpoint's response with json.load(response) inside a
try that only catches (URLError, TimeoutError, http.client.HTTPException)
— a deeply-nested JSON response from a JWKS endpoint raises the same raw
RecursionError, uncaught entirely (worse than the payload path, which at
least caught plain ValueError).
Affected versions: confirmed present in the current release, 2.14.0,
and on the current master branch (commit 4adcd02722f5011c60079d3978dfc167b9a8eaa5).
Reproduction
import base64, json, jwt
def b64url(b):
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(b).rstrip(b"=")
header = b64url(json.dumps({"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}).encode())
payload = b64url(b"[" * 20_000 + b"]" * 20_000)
token = (header + b"." + payload + b"." + b64url(b"forged-sig")).decode()
jwt.decode(token, options={"verify_signature": False})
# raises: RecursionError (not DecodeError/InvalidTokenError/PyJWTError)
Control: the same deeply-nested structure moved into the token's header
instead of its payload is correctly converted to jwt.DecodeError by the
already-hardened jwt/api_jws.py:360 — confirming the payload path is
specifically the missed half of the v2.14.0 hardening, not a general gap.
Impact assessment
Unauthenticated denial-of-service via unhandled exception on an auth path.
Not an auth bypass — rated medium. With signature verification enabled,
this parse runs after _verify_signature, so only the pre-verification
paths (get_signing_key_from_jwt, explicit verify_signature=False) are
attacker-reachable pre-auth; the JWKS-endpoint variant requires control of
(or a MITM on) the configured JWKS endpoint rather than being reachable
from an arbitrary client token.
Suggested fix
In jwt/api_jwt.py:299, change except ValueError as e: to
except (ValueError, RecursionError) as e:, mirroring
jwt/api_jws.py:360 exactly. In jwt/jwks_client.py, add the same
(ValueError, RecursionError) handling around json.load(response) in
fetch_data, raising PyJWKClientError (consistent with the method's
existing documented error contract). A patch implementing both, verified
against the full test suite (457 passed, 4 skipped — pre-existing,
environment-related) and against the reproduction above (now correctly
raises DecodeError), is attached (fix.patch).
Discovery method
Found and verified using scopegrep (https://github.com/not-ekalabya/scopegrep)
— a semantic code-retrieval tool that surfaces every other call site of a
symbol alongside relevance-ranked results, which is what surfaced the
already-hardened header path as the direct comparison here — paired with
an LLM coding agent (GLM-5.3) run as an open-ended security review of this
repository. Independently reproduced against the exact commit above before
this report was written. Happy to share the full session transcript on
request.
Disclosure status
Not shared with any other party or published. Submitting through this private channel per the project's stated security policy; no planned public/conference disclosure ahead of a coordinated timeline.
Maintainer triage update (2026-09-22)
Confirmed finding and scope
We confirmed that an attacker-controlled recursively nested JWT payload can cause a raw Python `RecursionEr
References
- GHSA-42vr-xj54-vc7v on OSV.dev
- Web: https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-42vr-xj54-vc7v
- Advisory: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101918
- Web: https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/5fde08a6cf906aa7698de2d6391d88b73006b17b
- Package: https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt
- Web: https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/releases/tag/2.15.0
Am I affected?
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About this data
Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.