CVE-2026-75522: OpenID4VP: X.509 chain validation accepts a forged certificate that reuses a trusted anchor's Subject DN without verifying its signature
High CVSS 7.5
- OSV id
- GHSA-4c2f-96cf-f5fc
- Also known as
- CVE-2026-75522
- Published
- Last modified
Affected packages
| Package | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| @openeudi/openid4vp npm |
< 0.8.1 | 0.8.1 |
How to fix it
Upgrade @openeudi/openid4vp to 0.8.1 or later.
npm install @openeudi/openid4vp@0.8.1
# if it is an indirect dependency: npm update @openeudi/openid4vp (or npm audit fix)
- If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or force the version with "overrides" (npm), "resolutions" (Yarn) or "pnpm.overrides" (pnpm) in package.json.
- Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.
Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.
Details
Summary
ChainBuilder (the private RFC 5280 validator behind TrustEvaluator and the public credential-parsing API) terminated chain building on Subject Distinguished Name string equality rather than on cryptographic closure to a trust anchor. A certificate whose Subject DN string matched a trusted anchor's Subject DN was accepted as the chain terminus with no signature verification against the anchor's public key.
An attacker who mints a self-signed certificate and copies a trusted anchor's Subject DN string onto it can therefore have that certificate — and any credential signed with its private key — accepted as issued under a trusted authority.
Impact
A relying party using @openeudi/openid4vp to verify OpenID4VP presentations (mdoc / SD-JWT VC) could be induced to accept a forged credential as genuine, defeating the trust-anchor model. In an eIDAS / EUDI age- or identity-verification deployment this permits impersonation of a trusted issuer.
Exploitable through the public verification path: TrustEvaluator.evaluate() returns a successful result (and, due to a secondary fallback, attributes the forged leaf to a real anchor's metadata), so downstream callers see a trusted outcome.
Details
src/trust/ChainBuilder.ts, tryBuild():
while (current.subject !== anchor.subject) { /* verify & climb */ }
// loop exits when current.subject === anchor.subject
return chain; // returned WITHOUT verifying `current` against the anchor
The signature-verified closure path (if (!issuer) -> verifySignature(current, anchor)) is correct, but the while guard provides a second, unverified exit: when a supplied certificate (the leaf, or an attacker-supplied intermediate) has a Subject DN string equal to the anchor's, the loop body never runs, no verifySignature call is made, and the chain is returned as valid. The per-certificate checks that do run (validity, algorithm, keyUsage) all operate on the attacker-controlled certificate and do not bind it to the anchor.
Secondary contributing weakness (src/trust/TrustEvaluator.ts): the anchor selected for the result was matched by serialNumber and fell back to anchors[0] when no match was found, so the forged leaf was reported alongside a genuine anchor's trustedAuthorityIds / provenance.
Proof of Concept
// Attacker mints a self-signed cert reusing a trusted anchor's Subject DN.
const impostor = selfSigned({ subject: trustedAnchor.subject /* string */ });
// Vulnerable: resolves to a valid chain [impostor] with no signature check.
await new ChainBuilder().build(impostor, [trustedAnchor]);
Patch
ChainBuilder.tryBuild() now requires the terminating certificate to be byte-identical to the trust anchor (DER rawData comparison) when the loop exits on DN equality; otherwise it throws CertificateChainError with reason: "signature". Cryptographic closure via verifySignature(current, anchor) remains the only other accepted termination. As defense-in-depth, TrustEvaluator now selects the terminating anchor by DER byte-identity and throws instead of silently falling back to the first candidate. Fixed in 0.8.1.
Workarounds
None. Upgrade to 0.8.1.
Credits
Reported by Reza Shokri — Quellkern e.U. (https://augenmass.tech), GitHub @devdotbo. Thanks for the thorough report, the self-contained reproduction, and coordinated disclosure.
References
- GHSA-4c2f-96cf-f5fc on OSV.dev
- Web: https://github.com/openeudi/openid4vp/security/advisories/GHSA-4c2f-96cf-f5fc
- Advisory: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75522
- Web: https://github.com/openeudi/openid4vp/pull/25
- Web: https://github.com/openeudi/openid4vp/commit/a3ffd435aadd61aff1f75ec4b2e1a0f44ffabf16
- Package: https://github.com/openeudi/openid4vp
- Web: https://github.com/openeudi/openid4vp/releases/tag/v0.8.1
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About this data
Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.