CVE-2026-112400: Pillow: GIF seek keeps rejected size after DecompressionBombError, allowing DoS
High
- OSV id
- GHSA-65qm-jvmh-6pqg
- Also known as
- BIT-pillow-2026-112400, CVE-2026-112400
- Published
- Last modified
Affected packages
| Package | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| pillow PyPI |
>= 9.2.0, < 13.0.0 | 13.0.0 |
Versions we track that it affects: pillow 10.4.0
How to fix it
Upgrade pillow to 13.0.0 or later.
# in requirements.txt: change the line to pillow==13.0.0
pip install -r requirements.txt
- If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or add a minimum version constraint for it (e.g. in constraints.txt, or as a dependency in pyproject.toml).
- Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.
Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.
Details
============================================================================
GIF seek keeps rejected size after DecompressionBombError, allowing DoS
Location: src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py:293 in GifImageFile._seek()
Commit: a707c6b21c313880d0771e54965d142dd42358b6
============================================================================
A GIF of about 60 bytes can make Pillow allocate gigabytes of memory. This affects applications that catch the "image too large" error raised while stepping to a later animation frame and then keep using the same image object. Pillow correctly refuses the oversized frame, but it stores the refused dimensions on the image object anyway, and later operations size their memory from them. An attacker who can upload a GIF to such a service can exhaust its memory: the process either fails with an out-of-memory error after committing gigabytes, or is killed by the operating system. There is no memory corruption.
The bug is in GifImageFile._seek() (src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py:292-294). When a frame's extent enlarges the image, the code assigns the new size to self._size and only then calls Image._decompression_bomb_check(). Nothing restores the old size when DecompressionBombError is raised, because seek() only rolls back on EOFError. After the caught error, im.size reports the rejected size while the pixel buffer im.im is still the 1×1 first frame. Because the extent is a 16-bit offset plus a 16-bit size, that rejected size can be as large as 131070×131070.
In the attached reproducer, the rejected size is 40000×40000. A retried seek(1) followed by load() then reaches load_prepare(), which calls Image.core.fill() with that size to decode a single pixel. Peak memory rises from 17 MiB to 1700 MiB before a 3 GiB address-space cap stops the next allocation. Image.new("RGB", im.size, ...) and rotate(..., expand=True) also allocate from the stale size.
The default paths are unaffected: plain Image.open() plus load(), ImageSequence.Iterator, and n_frames/is_animated. The ordering was introduced in c9f1b35e9810 ("Added GIF decompression bomb check", 2022-06-30, first released in 9.2.0), the check added for CVE-2022-45198. The two dispose-extent checks later in the same function already validate before using the size, and the attached patch makes this check follow the same order.
Details
GifImageFile._seek() lets a later frame enlarge the image, and performs the
decompression-bomb check for the new size only after storing it on the object:
# src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py:289-294 (GifImageFile._seek)
x0, y0 = i16(s, 0), i16(s, 2)
x1, y1 = x0 + i16(s, 4), y0 + i16(s, 6)
if (x1 > self.size[0] or y1 > self.size[1]) and update_image:
self._size = max(x1, self.size[0]), max(y1, self.size[1]) # state mutated
Image._decompression_bomb_check(self._size) # ...then validated
_decompression_bomb_check() (src/PIL/Image.py:3586) raises
DecompressionBombError for anything above 2 * MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS
(178 956 970 px by default), but by then self._size already holds the rejected
value and nothing restores it: seek() (GifImagePlugin.py:166-179) only rolls
back on EOFError, and _seek(0) only ever grows _size. The object that the
application still holds therefore reports im.size == (40000, 40000) while
im.im is the 1×1 buffer of frame 0. Compare the two dispose-extent checks a
few lines further down in the same function (GifImagePlugin.py:383 and :407),
which call _decompression_bomb_check(dispose_size) before the corresponding
Image.core.fill(), and TiffImagePlugin.load_prepare()
(src/PIL/TiffImagePlugin.py:1319-1321), which checks _tile_size before
allocating from it.
With this 60-byte GIF (hex)
47494638396101000100800000000000ffffff GIF89a, 1x1 screen, 2-entry global palette
2c000000000100010000 02 024401 00 frame 0: 1x1 @ (0,0), LZW data
2c00000000409c409c00 frame 1 descriptor: 40000x40000 @ (0,0)
2c000000000100010000 02 024401 00 another 1x1 frame
3b trailer
Image.open() succeeds (im.size == (1, 1)), im.seek(1) raises
DecompressionBombError: Image size (1600000000 pixels) exceeds limit of
178956970 pixels, and afterwards im.size == (40000, 40000),
im.im.size == (1, 1), im.tell() == 0.
What happens next depends on what the application does with the object, but
several ordinary operations take their dimensions from im.size rather than
from the C buffer:
- Retrying
im.seek(1). The failed_seekleftself.__offset == 0and the file pointer just past the 9-byte descriptor, so the retry parses whatever follows — in the file above, a valid 1×1 frame — and succeeds.im.load()then runsGifImageFile.load_prepare(): ```python # src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py:452-456 elif self.mode in ("RGB", "RGBA"): self.previm = self.
References
- GHSA-65qm-jvmh-6pqg on OSV.dev
- Web: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-65qm-jvmh-6pqg
- Advisory: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112400
- Web: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/6faed707cfb760a4cbd726ddc8406f576cf35bf7
- Package: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow
- Web: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/releases/tag/13.0.0
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About this data
Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.