CVE-2026-103035: TeamPass folder re-parenting authorization bypass

High CVSS 8.3

OSV id
GHSA-66q9-mxf2-xqw6
Also known as
CVE-2026-103035
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
nilsteampassnet/teampass
Packagist
< 3.2.2.0 3.2.2.0

How to fix it

Upgrade nilsteampassnet/teampass to 3.2.2.0 or later.

composer update nilsteampassnet/teampass
# if composer.json blocks it: composer require "nilsteampassnet/teampass:^3.2.2.0"
  • If it is an indirect dependency, `composer update` the package that requires it, with dependencies.
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

Summary

Missing authorization in the update_folder action: any authenticated non-read-only user can rename, re-parent and convert to personal any folder in the instance, moving another team's credential subtree into their own personal space and removing it from the organization. Confirmed at HEAD 2f271cdd (3.2.1.1), and present at 3.1.3.1 and 3.1.7.6.

The defect

The folder-management endpoint dispatches an update_folder action that renames and re-parents a folder. Unlike its sibling actions in the same file, it never checks the edited folder id or the submitted parent id against the caller's accessible-folder set, and the file itself performs no session/authorization gate at all. By pointing the new parent at their own personal folder, an authenticated low-privilege user takes ownership of any folder in the instance.

app/sources/folders.queries.php:

  • The file never calls the session/authorization helpers: a grep for checkSession and userAccessPage across the whole file returns zero hits.
  • case 'updatefolder' (lines 294-662) contains no reference to the caller's user-accessiblefolders set. The only access-related logic is the personal-folder computation at lines 428-468 and the guard at line 503, which short-circuits on (int) $isPersonal === 1.
  • The sibling actions do carry the check: case 'addfolder' validates against user-accessiblefolders at line 743, case 'deletefolders' at line 904, and case 'copyfolder' applies the equivalent parent check.

So update_folder is the one folder-mutating action in the file without an authorization predicate on either the target folder id or the new parent id.

Attacker model and trace

An authenticated TeamPass user who is not read-only (no administrative role required). The attacker submits updatefolder with the victim folder's id and a parentId pointing at their own personal folder. Because the new parent is personal, the personal-folder computation sets $isPersonal = 1, which satisfies the line 503 guard, and the update writes the new parent and personalfolder = 1 for the target folder.

Consequences: the stolen subtree is added to the attacker's accessible set on their next login, so the item list renders for them, and doitemslistinfolder exposes the plaintext label, login, url, email and description of every credential in that subtree (item passwords stay sharekey-protected, hence C:L). Because the folder is now flagged personal, it disappears from the organization view for everyone else including administrators (the admin listing selects only personal_folder = 0), so this is also a denial of access to the real owners.

Verification

Source-verified at HEAD: no session/authorization helper anywhere in the file; the updatefolder case contains no accessible-folders predicate while addfolder, deletefolders and copyfolder do; the personal-folder short-circuit at line 503. A live TeamPass instance was not stood up.

Secondary (needs a live confirmation before filing): there appears to be an unauthenticated variant. filterinput(INPUTPOST, 'key') returns null when omitted and $session->get('key') is null on a cookie-less session, so the null !== null comparison fails open; encryptClientServer is only set in public/index.php, so prepareExchangedData takes the plaintext-JSON branch. If that holds on a live instance this rises toward 9.4. The sibling actions fail closed on the anonymous path; only update_folder fails open. Please verify live, or report the authenticated variant alone (which stands on the source reading).

Suggested fix

In the updatefolder case, verify that both the target folder id and the submitted parentId are members of the caller's user-accessiblefolders set (mirroring addfolder and deletefolders) before applying the update, and reject a re-parent that would flip personalfolder for a folder the caller does not own. Adding the standard session/authorization gate to folders.queries.php as a whole is the more durable fix. Note items.queries.php has a second, identically named updatefolder case that does perform the accessible-folders check, but that one can only edit title/complexity; the unguarded copy in folders.queries.php is the one the UI calls for re-parenting.

Tooling

AI assistance was used while investigating, but it was confirmed at HEAD that folders.queries.php contains no checkSession/userAccessPage call, that the updatefolder case (lines 294-662) contains no accessible-folders predicate while addfolder (line 743) and delete_folders (line 904) do, and that the personal-folder short-circuit sits at line 503.

References

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About this data

Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.