CVE-2026-73864: install-artifact-from-github loads downloaded native artifacts without integrity verification
High CVSS 7.5
- OSV id
- GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396
- Also known as
- CVE-2026-73864
- Published
- Last modified
Affected packages
| Package | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| install-artifact-from-github npm |
< 1.7.0 | 1.7.0 |
How to fix it
Upgrade install-artifact-from-github to 1.7.0 or later.
npm install install-artifact-from-github@1.7.0
# if it is an indirect dependency: npm update install-artifact-from-github (or npm audit fix)
- If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or force the version with "overrides" (npm), "resolutions" (Yarn) or "pnpm.overrides" (pnpm) in package.json.
- Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.
Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.
Details
Description
bin/install-from-cache.js downloads a prebuilt native addon (*.node) over the network and writes it directly to the artifact path with no cryptographic integrity verification of any kind — no checksum manifest, no signature, no SRI. A scan of the whole package for createHash|sha256|checksum|integrity|digest|signature finds nothing. The file is then require()-loaded by the consumer, which executes the addon's native module-init code. Anyone able to influence the download achieves code execution on the installing machine.
Affected code (v1.6.0)
Mirror is fully attacker-steerable via an env var, no host pinning —
bin/install-from-cache.js:80:let assetUrl = mirrorHost || process.env[mirrorEnvVar] || 'https://github.com';re2passes--host-var RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR, so settingRE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR(CI config,.npmrc/env passthrough, a compromised CI job, a poisoned shell profile) redirects 100% of the download to an arbitrary host with zero pinning.The write sink is a bare
writeFile, no verification —bin/install-from-cache.js:185-187:const write = async (name, data) => { await fsp.mkdir(path.dirname(name), {recursive: true}); await fsp.writeFile(name, data); // `data` is the raw HTTP response body };Cleartext transfer + silent protocol downgrade on redirect —
bin/install-from-cache.js:155,165:const httpLib = isHttps.test(url) ? https : isHttp.test(url) ? http : null; // http:// supported ... get(res.headers.location).then(resolve, reject); // re-derives protocol from the NEW urlAn
https://asset that 302-redirects tohttp://is followed and fetched over plaintext, no warning, no scheme pinning, no redirect cap.
The post-download "verification" is not an integrity gate
isVerified() optionally runs npm run verify-build / npm test after writing the file. For re2, scripts/verify-build.js require()s the binary as its first line — i.e. the downloaded addon's native code has already executed by the time any check runs. It is a functional smoke test, not an integrity gate, and it is skipped entirely when any npm_config_platform* env var is set (:120-122).
Proof of concept
A self-contained, non-malicious PoC (poc.js) proves the missing-integrity property against the real install-from-cache, without shipping a weaponized binary: it stands up a plaintext-HTTP "mirror" serving a sentinel payload, runs install-from-cache with RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR pointed at it, and shows the served bytes are written verbatim to build/Release/re2.node:
npm i install-artifact-from-github
IAFG_BIN=./node_modules/install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js node poc.js
attacker mirror (plaintext http) on 127.0.0.1:PORT
[mirror] served 2083 attacker bytes over HTTP for /uhop/node-re2/releases/download/1.24.1/darwin-arm64-137
Writing to build/Release/re2.node ... Done.
install-from-cache exit: 0
served sha256: ec6fdde6...4ebc
written sha256: ec6fdde6...4ebc
✓ attacker bytes written VERBATIM to build/Release/re2.node — NO integrity check rejected them
The install succeeds (exit 0) with attacker-controlled bytes at the artifact path. Because a real .node executes on require() (NAPI/NODE_MODULE init), substituting a malicious one yields code execution in the installing/running process. (A full code-execution harness using a benign marker-writing native addon was verified separately and is available on request; withheld here to avoid shipping executable payloads.)
Attack scenarios (any one suffices)
- Attacker-configured or later-compromised
RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR. - Tampered GitHub release / compromised maintainer account — no checksum detects a swapped asset, even over HTTPS.
- On-path attacker where a plaintext (
http://) mirror or anhttps→httpredirect is in play.
Suggested fix
- Publish per-release
SHASUMS256.txt(or embed expected digests) and verify the download's SHA-256 before writing/loading; refuse on mismatch. (This is the modelprebuild-installalready uses.) - Reject
http://asset URLs andhttps→httpredirect downgrades; pin scheme across redirects; cap redirect count/hosts. - Document that
verify-build/testrun after load and cannot gate integrity.
PoC
poc.js:
```js // PoC — install-artifact-from-github writes a network-downloaded artifact to disk with NO // integrity verification, from an env-controlled mirror, over plaintext HTTP. // // This proves the CORE defect (arbitrary attacker-supplied bytes become build/Release/re2.node // with zero checksum/signature check) WITHOUT shipping a weaponized native binary: we serve a // sentinel payload and show byte-for-byte (sha256) that it is written verbatim as the artifact. // Because a .node artifact is dlopen()'d on require (running its module-init native code), an // attacker who substitutes it — via a compromi
References
- GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396 on OSV.dev
- Web: https://github.com/uhop/install-artifact-from-github/security/advisories/GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396
- Web: https://github.com/uhop/install-artifact-from-github/commit/1d2d8637556a03f6235e50fe0c238c6dce291633
- Package: https://github.com/uhop/install-artifact-from-github
- Web: https://github.com/uhop/install-artifact-from-github/releases/tag/1.7.0
Am I affected?
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About this data
Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.