CVE-2026-128137: NLTK corpus-reader view methods bypass the scoped root sandbox via intermediate-directory symlinks

Medium CVSS 5.5

OSV id
GHSA-g58v-j9g9-5gfg
Also known as
CVE-2026-128137
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
nltk
PyPI
>= 3.9.4, < 3.10.4 3.10.4

How to fix it

Upgrade nltk to 3.10.4 or later.

# in requirements.txt: change the line to nltk==3.10.4
pip install -r requirements.txt
  • If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or add a minimum version constraint for it (e.g. in constraints.txt, or as a dependency in pyproject.toml).
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

affected: PyPI nltk >= 3.9.4 — CorpusReader.abspaths()/abspath() and the PlaintextCorpusReader / SyntaxCorpusReader view methods dynamically reproduced: nltk 3.9.4 (8/9, scoped-escape checks), 3.10.3 (wheel, 9/9 checks) and master 6818767b9 (9/9 checks)


Source references (file:line) are to commit 303f6e2b (release tag v3.10.3). Line numbers in the released nltk wheel match this tag exactly; master 6818767b9 contains the same code (pathsec.py renumbered by +44 lines from added hardening comments). In 3.9.4 the same logic exists at earlier line numbers (api.py:222-236 for open(), api.py:161-203 for abspath()/abspaths(), data.py:382-388 for the pointer open, pathsec.py:105-114 for the scoped branch); the affected code is identical.

Summary

CorpusReader.open() (nltk/corpus/reader/api.py:235-257) is NLTK's hardened file-access entry point: after a lexical guard it calls validate_path(..., required_root=self._root) (api.py:246-249), and the scoped branch of pathsec.validate_path (nltk/pathsec.py:168-179) resolves symlinks and raises ValueError when the resolved target is not inside the corpus root. The view methods do not use this entry point: PlaintextCorpusReader.words/sents/paras (nltk/corpus/reader/plaintext.py:67-118) and SyntaxCorpusReader.parsed_sents/tagged_sents/sents/tagged_words/words (api.py:473-519) build their streams from self.abspaths(fileids, ...) (api.py:174-217), which only does a lexical self._root.join(fileid) (nltk/data.py:452-469) and returns a FileSystemPathPointer. That pointer is opened via FileSystemPathPointer.open() → pathsec.open(raw_path, "rb") with required_root left at its default None (data.py:438-447, nltk/pathsec.py:752,783), so only the global allowed-roots check runs. The O_NOFOLLOW in _hardened_open (pathsec.py:676-731) protects only the final path component, so an intermediate-directory symlink inside the corpus root pointing at a sibling allowed root is followed by the kernel. A caller who places such a symlink (or loads an untrusted corpus containing one) can read any file that open() would refuse — files outside the corpus root yet inside the global NLTK data sandbox — via PlaintextCorpusReader.words([...]) / SyntaxCorpusReader.words([...]) (and the abspaths()-returned pointer), defeating the scoped escape protection that GHSA-p4rw-class fixes and test_required_root_blocks_symlink_escape were added for.

Details

Root cause: two sibling file-access channels on the same CorpusReader disagree about the scoped sandbox.

  1. CorpusReader.open() (api.py:235-257) — the guarded channel:

    • Layer 1 lexical guard (api.py:240-242) rejects absolute paths and ...
    • Layer 2 scoped guard (api.py:246-249) calls pathsec.validate_path(path, context="CorpusReader", required_root=self._root).
    • The required_root branch (pathsec.py:168-179) resolves the target with Path(raw).resolve() and raises ValueError when target.is_relative_to(scoped_root) is false.
  2. The view-method channel — abspaths() → FileSystemPathPointer → pathsec.open(required_root=None):

    • CorpusReader.abspath() (api.py:174-183) and abspaths() (api.py:185-217) return self._root.join(f) with no validate_path call.
    • FileSystemPathPointer.join() (data.py:452-469) only normalizes lexically (normpath + root-prefix startswith); it never calls os.path.realpath/Path.resolve, so the intermediate symlink is preserved verbatim.
    • FileSystemPathPointer.open() (data.py:438-447) calls _secure_open(self._path, "rb") (aliased from pathsec.open) with no required_root, so pathsec.open (pathsec.py:752) uses its default required_root=None and validate_path (pathsec.py:783) runs only the global allowed-roots check (pathsec.py:181-207).
    • Under ENFORCE=True + POSIX, _hardened_open (pathsec.py:676-731) opens with O_NOFOLLOW (pathsec.py:705) — but that flag only refuses a symlink in the final component; an intermediate directory symlink (corpus/sub -> <other allowed root>) is followed by the kernel. The post-open fd realpath re-validation (pathsec.py:728-731) again uses required_root=None, and since the target is inside an allowed root it passes.
  3. The view methods hand the unguarded pointers straight to the stream views:

    • PlaintextCorpusReader.words/sents/paras (plaintext.py:67-118, abspaths at 76/96/116) and chapters (plaintext.py:230).
    • SyntaxCorpusReader.parsed_sents/tagged_sents/sents/tagged_words/words (api.py:473-519, abspaths at 478/489/498/509/517).
    • StreamBackedCorpusView._open() (nltk/corpus/reader/util.py:203-216) calls self._fileid.open(self._encoding) on the PathPointer (util.py:210), landing in the required_root=None path above.

Net effect (observed): the identical fileid "sub/secret.txt" is rejected by `reader.open()

References

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About this data

Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.