CVE-2026-103033: ALTCHA: Nil-map panic (pre-verification DoS) in v1 parseServerSignature on malformed VerificationData

Medium CVSS 5.3

OSV id
GHSA-gfwj-45pc-w6r5
Also known as
CVE-2026-103033
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-go/v2
Go
>= 2.0.0, < 2.1.0 2.1.0

How to fix it

Upgrade github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-go/v2 to 2.1.0 or later.

go get github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-go/v2@v2.1.0
go mod tidy
  • Indirect Go modules are upgraded the same way (`go get module@version`).
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

Summary

parseServerSignature in the v1 module only initializes ServerSignatureVerificationData.Extra inside the if err == nil branch after url.ParseQuery(parsedPayload.VerificationData). Go's url.ParseQuery returns the successfully-parsed pairs together with a non-nil error when the query string contains a malformed percent-escape. A subsequent loop unconditionally writes unknown keys into Extra, regardless of err, causing a nil-map write panic (assignment to entry in nil map) whenever an attacker supplies a VerificationData string with a bad %-escape (e.g. x=1&%zz=2).

This is reachable pre-authentication: parseServerSignature is called by the exported VerifyServerSignature / VerifyServerSignatureSafe before any HMAC/signature check, and VerificationData is attacker-controlled data forwarded by the client as part of the ALTCHA server-signature payload.

Impact

Any application calling VerifyServerSignature or VerifyServerSignatureSafe on unauthenticated input can be made to panic by submitting a crafted payload. Under standard net/http, the per-request goroutine panic is recovered and the request aborts (a log-flood / per-request DoS); it escalates to a full process crash if verification runs in an application-spawned goroutine or a non-recovering framework.

Proof Of Concept
payload, _ := json.Marshal(ServerSignaturePayload{
    Algorithm:        SHA256,
    VerificationData: "x=1&%zz=2",
    Signature:        "irrelevant",
    Verified:         true,
})
encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(payload)
VerifyServerSignature(encoded, "some-secret") // panics: assignment to entry in nil map
Patch

Extra is now initialized unconditionally before the url.ParseQuery error check, so it's always safe to write into regardless of parse errors.

Workarounds

Recover from panics around calls to VerifyServerSignature/VerifyServerSignatureSafe, or reject/sanitize VerificationData before calling them, until upgrading.

Patch

Patch commit: 2c4fc27

Credit

Reported by Arpit Jain (@arpitjain099) via private disclosure.

References

Am I affected?

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About this data

Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.