CVE-2026-77312: Flyto2 Core: Arbitrary file write via unguarded data.*/file.* modules (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-67429)

Critical CVSS 10.0

OSV id
GHSA-p34x-fmph-9fjx
Also known as
CVE-2026-77312
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
flyto-core
PyPI
< 2.26.8 2.26.8

How to fix it

Upgrade flyto-core to 2.26.8 or later.

# in requirements.txt: change the line to flyto-core==2.26.8
pip install -r requirements.txt
  • If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or add a minimum version constraint for it (e.g. in constraints.txt, or as a dependency in pyproject.toml).
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

[CRITICAL] Arbitrary file write via unguarded data.* / file.* write modules — incomplete fix of GHSA-2956

  • CWE: CWE-22 (Path Traversal) / CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path); impact reaches CWE-94 (code execution via file overwrite).
  • CVSS v3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.3 Critical (S:C because a write escapes the intended sandbox confinement into the host filesystem / other components).
    • AV:N — reachable via the MCP server / recipe engine (execute_module). AC:L — deterministic. PR:L — any client able to run a module/recipe (the same attacker model as GHSA-2956; unauthenticated on the HTTP MCP surface per CVE-2026-55786). UI:N. S:C — escapes FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR. C/I/A:H — arbitrary-content write to any absolute path → overwrite app code / recipes / ~/.bashrc / cron / authorized_keys → RCE.
  • Affected component: flyto-core (PyPI flyto-core), HEAD ae2b38e (v2.26.7 line). Modules data.csv.write (src/core/modules/atomic/data/csv_write.py), data.json_to_csv (.../data/json_to_csv.py), file.copy (.../file/copy.py), file.move (.../file/move.py) — and the broader data.*/file.*/report-writer families that do not call the path guard.
  • Relationship: Incomplete fix of GHSA-2956-977x-2w3r (Critical arbitrary file write, patched in v2.26.6 by commit d5f89d7). That fix routed a hand-picked module list (image.download/convert/resize/crop/compress/rotate/watermark/qrcode_generate, document.excel_write/pdf_fill_form/word_to_pdf/pdf_to_word, browser.pagination checkpoint) through validate_path_with_env_config(). It did not cover the data.* and file.* write families, which still write a client-controlled path with no confinement.

Reachability (hop-by-hop, guards resolved)

  1. Client invokes a module via the recipe engine / MCP execute_module (src/core/mcp_handler.py, mcp_server.py) — the same surface as GHSA-2956 / CVE-2026-55786.
  2. data.csv.write reads file_path = params.get('file_path') and data (both client-controlled). Its only path check is if '..' in file_path: raise — a denylist that does not block absolute paths.
  3. It calls os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(file_path), exist_ok=True) then open(file_path, 'w') and writes data. No call to validate_path_with_env_config() — so FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR confinement is never applied.
  4. data.json_to_csv (output_path), file.copy / file.move (shutil.copy2/shutil.move to destination) have no path check at all.
  5. An absolute path such as /home/<user>/.bashrc, /app/src/core/modules/.../<mod>.py, or a .flyto recipe file is written verbatim, outside the sandbox.

Guard analysis: the GHSA-2956 enforcement is per-module (e.g. image/download.py:21 imports and calls validate_path_with_env_config). There is no central path enforcement in the runtime — runtime/languages.py's PathTraversalError guards plugin entry-point loading, not module output paths. So a module that omits the per-module call is entirely unconfined.

Root cause

The remediation for GHSA-2956 confined writes by adding a per-module validate_path_with_env_config() call to an explicit list of modules, rather than enforcing confinement centrally. Any file-writing module absent from that list — the entire data.* and file.* families here — remains an arbitrary-write primitive. data.csv.write's '..'-substring check is a denylist that misses absolute paths.

Impact

Arbitrary file write with attacker-controlled content and path, escaping FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR. Overwriting a Python module under the install dir, a .flyto recipe, a shell rc, a crontab, or ~/.ssh/authorized_keys yields code execution / full host compromise — the same impact GHSA-2956 was rated Critical for.

Executable PoC (benign sentinel, local only)

FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR is set to the intended confinement; the module writes outside it while the GHSA-2956 guard rejects the same path.

```python import os, sys, asyncio SBX = os.environ.setdefault('FLYTOSANDBOXDIR', "/tmp/flytosbx"); os.makedirs(SBX, existok=True) sys.path.insert(0, "<flyto-core>/src") OUT = "/tmp/flytoPWNEDOUTSIDE.csv" # absolute, outside the sandbox, no ".." from core.utils import validatepathwithenvconfig, PathTraversalError try: validatepathwithenvconfig(OUT); print("[guard] UNEXPECTED allow") except PathTraversalError: print("[guard] GHSA-2956 guard REJECTS out-of-sandbox path (as intended)") async def call(W, p): return await W(p, {}).execute() from core.modules.atomic.data.csvwrite import csvwrite from core.modules.atomic.data.jsontocsv import jsontocsv asyncio.run(call(csvwrite, {'filepath': OUT, 'data':[{'pwn':'SENTINELCSV'}]})) asyncio.run(call(jsontocsv,{'inputdata':[{'pwn':'SENTINELJSON'}], 'outputpath': OUT+'.json.csv'})) print("wrote outside sandbox:", os.path.exists(OUT), "| inside sandbox?", os.path.realpath(OUT).startswith(os.path.real

References

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Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.