CVE-2026-77313: Flyto2 Core: SSRF guard validates the resolved IP but connects by hostname, allowing DNS-rebinding TOCTOU
High CVSS 7.1
- OSV id
- GHSA-pfg2-w999-497v
- Also known as
- CVE-2026-77313
- Published
- Last modified
Affected packages
| Package | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| flyto-core PyPI |
< 2.26.8 | 2.26.8 |
How to fix it
Upgrade flyto-core to 2.26.8 or later.
# in requirements.txt: change the line to flyto-core==2.26.8
pip install -r requirements.txt
- If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or add a minimum version constraint for it (e.g. in constraints.txt, or as a dependency in pyproject.toml).
- Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.
Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.
Details
Summary
validate_url_ssrf resolves the hostname, checks the IP against private ranges, then discards the IP and returns the hostname URL string. aiohttp performs a fresh, independent DNS resolution at connect time. An attacker controlling DNS for a hostname (TTL 0, alternating public IP and internal IP) passes validation on the first lookup and connects to the internal IP on the second — a classic check-then-use race. SECURITY_SSRF.md line 63 explicitly claims DNS-rebinding is prevented; it is not.
Root Cause
src/core/utils.py:523 returns the hostname URL after validation; the resolved IP is never pinned. A repo grep of http/ and utils.py for TCPConnector / resolver / response.history / on_request_redirect / IP-pinning returns NONE. Each module builds a fresh ClientSession per call → the connect-time getaddrinfo is independent of the validation-time lookup.
Impact
Defeats the SSRF guard on ALL modules that call it (readable internal fetch). Independent of IP-range completeness — the private IP is never presented to is_private_ip. Requires attacker DNS control + winning the resolution race → AC:H.
Proof of Concept
Code-proven: validate_url_ssrf returns the hostname (utils.py:523); no pinned-IP connector anywhere. Two independent resolutions occur (validation-time and aiohttp connect-time).
attacker DNS: rebind.attacker.tld TTL 0, alternating public IP and the cloud metadata IP
execute_module http.get {"url":"http://rebind.attacker.tld/latest/meta-data/..."}
Attack Chain
- Entry:
http.get {url:"http://rebind.attacker.tld/..."}. Guard:validate_url_with_env_config. Bypass proof:getaddrinfo(rebind.attacker.tld)returns the public IP,is_private_ip=False(utils.py:511-519); returns the hostname URL (:523) — the IP is discarded. - Sink:
session.get("http://rebind.attacker.tld/...")(get.py:116). aiohttp performs a FRESH independentgetaddrinfoat connect → now resolves to the internal IP. Bypass proof: noTCPConnector/AsyncResolver/pinned-IP inhttp/(grep confirms none). Two lookups. - Impact: internal fetch, body returned.
Bypass Evidence
utils.py:523 returns the hostname string, not a pinned IP; grep confirms no IP pinning or custom resolver anywhere on the path; fresh ClientSession per call guarantees an independent second resolution.
Affected Versions
<= 2.26.6 — utils.py:523 present on latest release tag; no pinning added on HEAD.
Suggested Fix
Resolve the hostname once, pin the validated IP, and connect to that IP (custom TCPConnector/resolver) — reject any connect-time resolution that differs. This is the fix SECURITY_SSRF.md already claims is in place.
Credit
Vulnerability discovered by zx (Jace).
References
- GHSA-pfg2-w999-497v on OSV.dev
- Web: https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/security/advisories/GHSA-pfg2-w999-497v
- Web: https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/commit/bf748df864d348004cf45d830bc59f62c5c4a58a
- Package: https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core
- Web: https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/releases/tag/v2.26.8
Am I affected?
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About this data
Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.