CVE-2026-121716: fzf: Arbitrary command execution via bash arithmetic expansion on unvalidated layout size in fzf-tmux (-l/-u attached value)

High CVSS 7.0

OSV id
GHSA-w6x2-f5m4-xw82
Also known as
CVE-2026-121716
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
github.com/junegunn/fzf
Go
< 0.74.5 0.74.5

How to fix it

Upgrade github.com/junegunn/fzf to 0.74.5 or later.

go get github.com/junegunn/fzf@v0.74.5
go mod tidy
  • Indirect Go modules are upgraded the same way (`go get module@version`).
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

Summary

bin/fzf-tmux fails to validate layout size values given in the attached form (e.g. -l50). For -l/-u these values reach bash arithmetic expansion ($(( max - size ))), where an operand like a[$(cmd)] executes cmd as the invoking user during option parsing — before any tmux interaction and even outside tmux. A second sink embeds unvalidated popup geometry (-x/-y/-w/-h/-p) into an unquoted tmux popup ... $opt ... invocation, allowing injection of tmux flags such as -e BASH_ENV=<path> (command execution via non-interactive bash sourcing $BASH_ENV).

Reporter / Credits:

Sai Sreewathsa Kovalluri, Shon Babu and Kannan K (Researchers), Innspark Solutions https://innspark.in/

Details

In bin/fzf-tmux (tag 0.74.4, commit a140afeb), the option parser validates size values with a regex (^[0-9%,]+$ / ^[A-Z]$) only for the separate-argument form (line 82). The attached form is captured unvalidated at line 80:

if [[ ${#arg} -gt 2 ]]; then
  size="${arg:2}"                       # no validation
else
  if [[ $1 =~ ^[0-9%,]+$ ]] || [[ $1 =~ ^[A-Z]$ ]]; then   # only separate form validated

For -l and -u, swap is non-empty (lines 68/75), so size reaches arithmetic evaluation:

  • line 120: size=$((max - size)) (non-percent values)
  • line 102: opt="$opt -l $((100 - size))%" (percent, tmux >= 3.2)
  • line 108: opt="$opt -p $((100 - size))" (percent, tmux < 3.2)

Bash arithmetic expands array subscripts, so a[$(command)] runs command. Verified end-to-end against the unmodified script (see PoC).

Second sink (same root cause): opt is used unquoted at line 236 (tmux popup -d "$PWD" $opt "bash $argsf") and line 249, so a geometry value containing spaces injects extra tmux flags, e.g. -e BASH_ENV=/path/to/script.

PoC

Verified on 0.74.4 (no tmux or fzf binary needed — a stub fzf on PATH suffices because the sink fires during bash argument parsing):

$ bash bin/fzf-tmux '-l a[$(id > /tmp/pwn1)]'      # line 120 sink (non-percent)
$ bash bin/fzf-tmux '-u a[$(id > /tmp/pwn2)]%'     # line 102/108 sink (percent)

$ cat /tmp/pwn1 /tmp/pwn2
uid=1001(sb) gid=1001(sb) groups=...
uid=1001(sb) gid=1001(sb) groups=...

A self-contained reproducer was provided by email (poc-t03-arithmetic.sh). Popup flag-injection variant (tmux >= 3.2): bash bin/fzf-tmux -p '-x0 -e BASH_ENV=/path/to/evil.sh'.

Impact

Local command injection (CWE-78). fzf-tmux argv is commonly assembled by third-party scripts and editor plugins (e.g. fzf-tmux -l "${height}%"); any layout value influenced by less-trusted data (project-local config, wrapper scripts) yields arbitrary command execution as the invoking user. Suggested fixes: apply the regex validation to the attached form, constrain size to [0-9]+ before any $((...)), and build the tmux invocation as an array ("${opt_parts[@]}") instead of unquoted $opt.

Reported privately to the maintainer by email; fixes prepared for the next release.

Exploitability in practice

Impact is high (command execution as the invoking user), but a real attack requires attacker-controlled data to reach the fzf-tmux layout arguments (-l/-u). In normal use these values are set by the user or by trusted, hardcoded configuration, so a vulnerable data flow is uncommon. The issue is local-only, requires the victim to run fzf-tmux with the poisoned value, and bin/fzf-tmux has been superseded by the built-in --tmux/--popup option since 0.53.0.

References

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About this data

Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.