CVE-2026-77369: Daptin: Broken Access Control (IDOR) in the generic YJS collaboration endpoint

Critical CVSS 9.6

OSV id
GHSA-wj7x-58c2-5793
Also known as
CVE-2026-77369
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
github.com/daptin/daptin
Go
>= 0.11.4, < 0.12.30 0.12.30

How to fix it

Upgrade github.com/daptin/daptin to 0.12.30 or later.

go get github.com/daptin/daptin@v0.12.30
go mod tidy
  • Indirect Go modules are upgraded the same way (`go get module@version`).
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

Summary

Daptin registers a generic WebSocket endpoint, GET /yjs/:documentName, for real-time collaborative document editing (YJS/CRDT). Unlike its purpose-built sibling route, this generic endpoint performs no per-resource authorization check - it only verifies that some user session exists. Because the document store parses :documentName as typename.referenceId.columnName and fetches that row's real column content unconditionally, any authenticated user (including a brand-new, zero-privilege, self-registered account) can read - and, since YJS sync is bidirectional, also write - the content of any file.*-typed column on any row of any table, including tables that are admin-only by default.

Details

InitializeYjsResources (server/endpoint_yjs.go) registers two routes.

The purpose-built, correctly-secured route, registered once per file.*-typed column on every table:

// server/endpoint_yjs.go:47-113 (abridged)
path := fmt.Sprintf("/live/%v/:referenceId/%v/yjs", typename, columnInfo.ColumnName)
...
return func(ginContext *gin.Context) {
    sessionUser := ...
    if sessionUser == nil { ginContext.AbortWithStatus(403); return }
    ...
    object, _, getErr := cruds[typename].GetSingleRowByReferenceIdWithTransaction(typename, parsedId, nil, tx)
    if getErr != nil { ginContext.AbortWithStatus(404); return }
    ...
    objectPermission := cruds[typename].GetRowPermission(object, tx2)
    if !objectPermission.CanUpdate(user.UserReferenceId, user.Groups, cruds[typename].AdministratorGroupId) {
        ginContext.AbortWithStatus(401)
        return
    }
    roomName := fmt.Sprintf("%v%v%v%v%v", typename, ".", referenceId, ".", columnInfo.ColumnName)
    ...
    yjsConnectionHandler(ginContext.Writer, ginContext.Request)
}

This route correctly requires a session, loads the actual row, and checks objectPermission.CanUpdate(...) for the specific requesting user before allowing the WebSocket upgrade.

A second, generic route is registered right above it, with none of those checks:

// server/endpoint_yjs.go:27-38
defaultRouter.GET("/yjs/:documentName", func(ginContext *gin.Context) {
    sessionUser := ginContext.Request.Context().Value("user")
    if sessionUser == nil {
        ginContext.AbortWithStatus(403)
        return
    }
    yjsConnectionHandler(ginContext.Writer, ginContext.Request)
})

The only gate here is "is some session present" - there is no lookup of the referenced row, no GetRowPermission, no CanUpdate/CanRead check at all. :documentName is taken verbatim from the URL and handed straight to yjsConnectionHandler.

The YJS document store's content provider parses documentName using exactly the typename.referenceId.columnName convention the secure route builds internally as roomName, and uses it to fetch the real row from the database with no authorization check of its own:

// server/yjs_doucment_provider.go:41-115 (abridged)
ydb.WithInitialContentProvider(func(documentPath string) []byte {
    pathParts := strings.Split(documentPath, ".")
    typeName, referenceId, columnName := pathParts[0], pathParts[1], pathParts[2]
    crud := cruds[typeName]
    object, _, getErr := crud.GetSingleRowByReferenceIdWithTransaction(typeName, parsedId,
        map[string]bool{columnName: true}, tx)
    ...
    // decodes and returns the actual file/column content, base64-decoded, as the
    // initial content of the shared collaborative document
})

Because the generic route performs no permission check, any authenticated user can supply documentName = "<any table>.<any reference_id>.<any file.* column>" and the initial YJS sync will serve them that row's real content - including rows whose table has DefaultGroups: adminsGroup (admin-only by default, e.g. the built-in calendar table) or rows an ordinary user's own row-level permissions would otherwise forbid them from reading. Since YJS sync is bidirectional, a connected client can also push edits, which legitimate collaborators may later pull back in through the correctly secured /live/... route, giving a write/corruption path as well as a read path.

PoC

Built and ran current HEAD in a clean container; created two accounts (admin@admin.com, first signup -> admin; bob@bob.com, second signup -> ordinary, non-admin user with default permissions only):

```bash

1) Generic endpoint accepts ANY authenticated session for ANY document name,

including a syntactically-valid-but-nonexistent reference_id on an admin-only table:

curl -i -N \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $BOB_TOKEN" \ -H "Connection: Upgrade" -H "Upgrade: websocket" \ -H "Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13" -H "Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==" \ "http://localhost:6336/yjs/calendar.deadbeef-0000-0000-0000-000000000000.content"

=> HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols <-- ACCEPTED, no ownership/permission check at all

2) The purpose-built, secured sibling route correctly validates the very same i

References

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About this data

Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.