CVE-2026-128135: NLTK: ZIP package extraction follows in-root hardlinks and overwrites files outside the NLTK data root
High CVSS 7.1
- OSV id
- GHSA-wr3g-j6qj-xpgh
- Also known as
- CVE-2026-128135
- Published
- Last modified
Affected packages
| Package | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| nltk PyPI |
>= 3.9.4, < 3.10.4 | 3.10.4 |
How to fix it
Upgrade nltk to 3.10.4 or later.
# in requirements.txt: change the line to nltk==3.10.4
pip install -r requirements.txt
- If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or add a minimum version constraint for it (e.g. in constraints.txt, or as a dependency in pyproject.toml).
- Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.
Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.
Details
Summary
NLTK ships a security wrapper, nltk.pathsec.ZipFile, that is meant to confine archive extraction to trusted data roots and to block link-based escapes. When nltk.download() installs a package, the extraction write opens each member's target path without checking whether that path is a hardlink to a file located outside the data root. A local actor who can write inside a shared or predictable NLTK data root (for example ~/nltk_data, a group-writable /usr/share/nltk_data, or a shared container volume) can pre-plant an in-root hardlink at a member path that a soon-to-be-installed package will write. When the victim later runs the download, extraction truncates and overwrites the outside-root target through that hardlink. This is the same weakness class as the previously fixed downloader hardlink issue, but the fix did not reach the package-extraction write sink, so the latest published release remains exploitable through this path.
Root Cause
The prior fix added an st_nlink > 1 refusal to the file-open helpers (nltk.pathsec.open / _hardened_open) and routed the downloader temporary-file write through that hardened opener, so a multiply-linked inode is refused on those paths. The extraction write sink was never given the same check. On published releases, nltk.pathsec.ZipFile.extract validates member names with validate_zip_archive and then delegates to the standard library extractor, whose plain open(targetpath, "wb") opens and truncates a pre-existing hardlink. The containment guard validate_zip_archive relies on Path.resolve() and name checks; resolve() follows symlinks (so a symlinked member is correctly refused) but a hardlink has a legitimate in-root name and in-root resolved path, so it passes. No code on the extraction path performs the st_nlink fstat that the sibling open helper performs.
Affected component: nltk.pathsec (archive extraction), driven by nltk.downloader
Released sink (<= 3.10.3): nltk/pathsec.py ZipFile.extract -> stdlib zipfile._extract_member -> open(targetpath, "wb")
Containment guard that fails open for hardlinks: nltk/pathsec.py validate_zip_archive (name checks + Path.resolve())
Development-branch sink: nltk/pathsec.py ZipFile._extract_member leaf reopen with O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC|O_NOFOLLOW (no st_nlink fstat)
Impact
An unprivileged local user who can create a file inside a data root that the victim's NLTK installation will extract into can cause the victim's process to truncate and overwrite a file outside that root. The attacker chooses which outside file is destroyed by selecting the hardlink target, so the integrity impact is complete for the chosen path (arbitrary outside-root file destruction). Where the victim resolves packages through an attacker-influenced mirror or index, the overwritten bytes are also attacker-chosen, which plausibly enables targeted file replacement and later code execution if the victim subsequently consumes the replaced file; that escalation is plausible rather than demonstrated here. Practical exploitation requires either that kernel hardlink protection (fs.protected_hardlinks) is disabled, or that the outside target is one the planting actor is permitted to hardlink (owned, writable, or group-shared), which is the same precondition carried by the previously accepted advisory for this weakness class.
Proof of Concept
Dependencies: a released nltk (3.10.3) installed from PyPI. The demonstration creates a data root, a victim file outside it, and a package archive whose member path is pre-planted as a hardlink to the victim file, then extracts through the security wrapper. It runs as a single user and succeeds even with fs.protected_hardlinks=1.
Steps:
- Register a data root with
nltk.data.pathand create an extraction subtree inside it. - Create a victim file outside the data root.
- Pre-plant an in-root hardlink at the member path the archive will write.
- Extract the archive through
nltk.pathsec.ZipFile.extract.
import os, sys, tempfile, zipfile
import nltk
import nltk.pathsec as ps
work = tempfile.mkdtemp()
data_root = os.path.join(work, "nltk_data")
extract_root = os.path.join(data_root, "corpora")
os.makedirs(os.path.join(extract_root, "pkgid"))
nltk.data.path.insert(0, data_root)
outside = os.path.join(work, "victim.txt")
open(outside, "w").write("ORIGINAL-VICTIM-CONTENT")
zippath = os.path.join(data_root, "pkg.zip")
with zipfile.ZipFile(zippath, "w") as z:
z.writestr("pkgid/target", "PWNED-BY-EXTRACTION")
member_abs = os.path.join(extract_root, "pkgid/target")
os.link(outside, member_abs) # pre-planted in-root hardlink
with ps.ZipFile(zippath, "r") as z:
z.extract("pkgid/target", path=extract_root)
print("victim now:", open(outside).read())
victim now: PWNED-BY-EXTRACTION
The equivalent test using a symlink instead of a hardlink is refused by validate_zip_archive with a Security Violation, isolating the missing guard to hard
References
- GHSA-wr3g-j6qj-xpgh on OSV.dev
- Web: https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-wr3g-j6qj-xpgh
- Advisory: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-128135
- Web: https://github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3753
- Web: https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/0e9898b7615b4ab3b023e868212316a489ece4f0
- Web: https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/cf12a5e6a439fe1d722acd53d4309911faaaaf78
- Package: https://github.com/nltk/nltk
- Web: https://github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.4
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About this data
Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.