CVE-2026-128138: NLTK incomplete fix: additional JVM/JAR sandbox bypass through unvalidated launcher tokens in java() command arguments
Critical CVSS 9.8
- OSV id
- GHSA-x8q7-6c7m-52gw
- Also known as
- CVE-2026-128138
- Published
- Last modified
Affected packages
| Package | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| nltk PyPI |
>= 3.10.3, < 3.10.4 | 3.10.4 |
How to fix it
Upgrade nltk to 3.10.4 or later.
# in requirements.txt: change the line to nltk==3.10.4
pip install -r requirements.txt
- If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or add a minimum version constraint for it (e.g. in constraints.txt, or as a dependency in pyproject.toml).
- Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.
Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.
Details
Summary
NLTK 3.10.3 contains security hardening intended to close JVM argument-injection and untrusted JAR/classpath execution paths in nltk.internals.java(), including the issue published as GHSA-m4rf-3fr8-xwx3.
The patched options channel correctly rejects Java argument-file references such as @/path/to/args and launcher modes such as -jar. However, an additional argument channel remains: the caller-provided cmd sequence is appended to the Java command after the validated option and classpath channels, without enforcing that its first item is a Java main-class name.
I am reporting this as an additional post-fix bypass / incomplete-fix path affecting the 3.10.3 remediation, rather than as an unrelated vulnerability family.
As a result, the same launcher token that is rejected through options can be supplied as the first cmd item. I confirmed two reachable forms against the official nltk-3.10.3-py3-none-any.whl:
- direct use of the public
nltk.internals.java()helper withcmd=["-jar", ...]; and - the higher-level
StanfordSegmenter, whose publicjava_classconstructor argument becomes the firstcmditem and accepts an@argfilelauncher token.
Both paths execute an external researcher-controlled JAR without setting NLTK_ALLOW_UNSAFE_JARS, NLTK_ALLOW_UNSAFE_CLASSPATH, or using trusted_raw_options. The original explicit outside-classpath route is blocked in 3.10.3, while the alternate command channel executes the JAR 3/3 times.
Affected artifact
Package: nltk
Confirmed affected version: 3.10.3
Wheel: nltk-3.10.3-py3-none-any.whl
SHA-256: ff9598a8e20518ee0d557745890cc4435b9578489e2dcbc69c4f81fa060caf7c
Baseline artifact:
Version: 3.10.2
Wheel: nltk-3.10.2-py3-none-any.whl
SHA-256: 2c7ccacb765c5e26b0cb60fb1b57080af522c6924d12a714a243305ba3637412
Relationship to the 3.10.3 security fixes
The existing 3.10.3 hardening validates the dedicated per-call options list before it reaches subprocess.Popen. In particular, the exact @argfile token used in this report is rejected through options with a ValueError that references CVE-2026-12841 and CWE-88.
The command is subsequently assembled in this order:
final_cmd.extend(validated_options)
if classpath_arg is not None:
final_cmd.extend(["-cp", classpath_arg])
final_cmd.extend(cmd_list)
cmd_list is copied from the public cmd argument but its first token is not checked to ensure that it is an ordinary Java main class. Java therefore interprets leading -jar, @argfile, module-mode, or classpath-mode tokens as launcher control arguments rather than application arguments.
This is an alternate argument channel around the same JVM argument/JAR execution boundary protected by the 3.10.3 changes.
Confirmed API paths
Direct public helper
nltk.internals.java(
["-jar", "/outside/trusted/roots/controlled.jar"],
classpath=None,
stdout="pipe",
stderr="pipe",
)
The external JAR executed in all three subject runs.
Higher-level StanfordSegmenter path
StanfordSegmenter exposes a public java_class constructor argument, stores it, and later places it at the beginning of the cmd sequence passed to nltk.internals.java().
A controlled argument file containing a -jar launcher invocation was supplied as:
StanfordSegmenter(
path_to_jar=trusted_segmenter_jar,
java_class="@/path/to/controlled-launcher.args",
path_to_model="dummy-model",
java_options=[],
)
The trusted segmenter JAR passed the wrapper's checksum and classpath checks. The @argfile then switched the Java launcher to the external JAR, which executed in all three runs.
The deprecated wrapper subsequently raised an unrelated post-launch AttributeError while processing its output. The external marker had already been written by the child JVM before that exception.
Proof matrix
R1 NLTK 3.10.2 + explicit external classpath
-> controlled Java bytecode executed
R2 NLTK 3.10.3 + same explicit external classpath
-> UntrustedJarError; no marker
R3A NLTK 3.10.3 + direct cmd=["-jar", external_jar]
-> controlled external JAR executed, 3/3
R3B NLTK 3.10.3 + StanfordSegmenter(java_class="@argfile")
-> controlled external JAR executed, 3/3
R4 NLTK 3.10.3 + ordinary main class in trusted classpath
-> legitimate execution preserved
A direct channel comparison also confirmed:
options=["@argfile"] -> BLOCKED
cmd/java_class="@argfile" -> EXTERNAL JAR EXECUTED
Machine-readable proof results and a portable reproducer are attached.
Preconditions
Practical exploitability depends on an embedding application exposing attacker influence over one of these public argument paths:
- the leading item of
nltk.internals.java(cmd=...); or StanfordSegmenter(java_class=...)or an equivalent wrapper-controlled command token.
The attacker must also be able to reference an argument file or
References
- GHSA-x8q7-6c7m-52gw on OSV.dev
- Web: https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-x8q7-6c7m-52gw
- Advisory: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-128138
- Web: https://github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3771
- Web: https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/b36212795a522d2b7b176cf0e0d9d8da489ba6e6
- Package: https://github.com/nltk/nltk
- Web: https://github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.4
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About this data
Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.